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IN THE SUPRE'1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL F. NALTOtl,
Plaintiff and Apoellant,

District Court No.
21341

vs.
KENNETH F. WALTON and
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS &
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Supreme Court No.
15552

Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND
APPELLANT, PAUL F. r"7ALTON

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second Judicial
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the
Honorable John F. Nahlquist, District Judge.

The judgment

of the court was for the defendant and against the plaintiff,
finding no cause of action against either Defendants.
This is also an appeal from a subsequent order from the
said court, filed December 7, 1977, issued by the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist of said District Court on the 5th day of
December, 1977 accepting defendants proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial and for an opportunity to rebut the facts
as found by the court and for amendment of judgment and denying
Plaintiff's motion for the nublication of a transcript to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-1- OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

be considered with plaintiff's motion for a new trial and
for

consideratio~

of the law and for an opportunity to

rebut the facts as found by the court.
DISPOSITION IN

LO''lE~

COUR.T

Trial in the above entitled matter was heard before
the Honorable John F. Walhauist, District Judge, on October
17, 18, and 19, 1977 at which time the court heard testimonies
and received the exhibits and evidences presented by
Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondent and further
heard argument of counsel pertaining to the legal issues
involved in the case and thereafter took the matter under
advisement.

On the 27th day of October, 1977, the court

issued its memorandum decision containing Findings o= Fact
and Conclusions of Law in a general statement in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiff.

Thereafter

the nlaintiff filed motions for a new trial and for an ooportuni ty to rebut the facts as found bv the court and for an
amendment of judgment, and objected to the Findings of
Eact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
the

Defendant-~espondent

submitted by

and further moved that in support

of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial a publication
of the transcript of the decosition of ~oseph Moore be made
and considered with the plaintiff's motion to suonort their
cause.

All of the above referred to motions were denied

and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment

of the defendants were accented.

Plaintiff
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,I

filed his Notice of Acpeal and the case is now before
This Honorable Court pursuant to that Notice of Apceal.
RELIEF
0

SOU~HT

ON ADDBAL

laintiff-Aonellant seeks for a reversal of the judgment

of the said Second Judicial Distract Court of Davis County
and further seeks for the relief prayed for in nlaintiff's
~otion

for a new trial, etc., and for 6laintiff's Motion for

the Publication of the Transcrict of Joseph Moore's Denosition
oerrriitting the

0

laintiff-Anpellant onoortunitv to rebut

the facts found by the court.
STATEHENT OF l"AC':"S
On the 18th dav of

~av

1955, plaintiff's predecessor

in interest, Orson F. Walton, entered into a lease agreement
with Kenneth F. Walton, Kaysville, Utah, one of the DefendantResoondents herein (Defendants exhibit 1).

Thereafter, on

or about 1971, defendant Fife Rock ?roducts and Construction
Cornpanv began ooerating under a lease in the Nalton Gravel
~it

(T. 316 line 30; 322 lines 9-15).

During the course of

nreliminarv proceedinqs the parties filed their Motions to
Compel Discoverv including

0

laintiff's Motion to Compel

the Droduction of Documents recuesting that a lease between
the defendants Kenneth F.

~alton

and Fife Rock

and Construction Comoanv be nrovided.

0

roducts

Bv stioulation of

the oarties this carticular question was taken uc on the
~retrial

conference and

0

laintiff's Motion to Compel the
-3-
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Production of the lease between the defendants was denied
(R. 20).

Prior to 1971 and as early as sometime orior to

1968 the defendant Fife Rock Products operated under a lease
held by Mr. Smedley, is sued to him bv Kenneth F. v!a 1 ton
(T. 317).

It is further evident that thev were working on

extracting gravel from the pit as early as May 29, 1962 (T. 318
The lease terminated v'i th Fife Rock :Products the same
time as the lease terminated between Kenneth F. Walton and
the :Plaintiff-Appellant (?. 16).
On or ahout 1965, after the first ten vear period of
the old lease between Kenneth F. Walton and Orson F. Walton,
a dispute arose as the language of the lease and as to
whether the remainderman, Lerene Walton, the successor in
interest to Orson F. Walton, was entitled to reenter and take
nossession of the premises.
concluded bv legal

That narticular disoute was

action and a stioulation orally oresented

in the record of the court on the 7th dav of Julv, 1967

(P.

By that stioulation the lease was to continue for another
period of ten vears, after which the defendant, Kenneth

F. Walton was to surface and terrace the land, in comoliance
with Davis County "lanninq Commission reciuirement and fill
in larqe caverns and holes.

MR. PORBES:
"That when the lease terminates, that
he so surface and terrace the land to comply with the
requirements of the Davis Countv 0 lanning Commission,
buf specif icallv that there be ieft no large caverns
or holes.
I think that .
~1R.

KING:

'I think that covers it."
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21 ·

'!'HE

0

LAINTIFT:

'1R. KI:--v;:
~1R.

"It isn't to be rene"'7ed.''

''That's right.''

FORBES:

'"!'hat's right."

The stioulation was thereafter enforced on October 23,
1°69, and a iudgment obtained on the terms thereof.
i tern Number l

(CJ)

Under

thereof we read:

'!'hat upon the termination of the said lease, the defendant
shall comnlv with the reauirernents of the Davis Countv
Planning Commission with respect to terracing and wili
specificallv see to it that there are no large caverns
or holes left unon the ?remises ( 0 • 1).
The major difference between the stioulation and the judgment
is that the judgment does not make reference to the "surfacing·•
that the stipulation makes reference to.

It should be

concluded, ho1Vever, that that was contemolated since that was
the stinulation of the partv.
Little or no contact or communication occurred between
the defendant Kenneth F. ''7alton and/or Fife Rock :Products
Construction Comoany and the

Plaintiff-A~~ellant

vears that followed and this due to the fact that
D.

durinq the
~r.

0

aul

Malton, the final successor in interest, Plaintiff-A;pellant

herein, had been restrained and enjoined from making contact.
~he

next comrnunica ti on made bv Mr. i:>aul F. r•!al ton and

as set forth in the evidence was his letter of the 24th
day of March, 1975, advising that the lease hold interest
'.vas terminating on the 18th day of '1ay, 1975, deM.anding
that all eauinment and materials, scale and scalehouses,
etc. be removed from the nremises by the 18th day of Mav, 1975,

-5-
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further permittinq a period until the 18th dav of November,
1975, for rehabilitation efforts to be made (P. 16).
subsequent to the receiot of that letter the DefendantRespondent Fife Rock nroducts sent in a V-8 caterpillar
and aooroximately 2 or 3 nersons to accomnlish the ''rehabilitac:
work".

This was accomplished within the snan of three

8-hour work days at the most (T. 336)

following the

terminatio~

of excavation during the span of twenty years.
Thereafter, one of the workmen oresented to n1aintiffAopellant Exhibit P. 17 purporting to be a letter of release,
releasing Fife Rock Products Company, Inc. from a further
obligation.

The said release was never signed by the

Plaintiff-Appellant, who told them that in his ooinion
there had been no rehabilitation efforts accomplished
(T. 17-18 and P. 17).
Therea~ter

1'.)laintiff wrote a letter on the 12th day of .June,

1975, to the Davis County Planning Commission, asking:
"T·Jill vou please look into this matter and deterrrtine
what tvpe of rehabilitation efforts are going to be
required of Fife Construction Comnanv bv the Countv,
and the time frame in which such efforts might be
expected.
I would like a detailed engineering olan
submitted, and to have anv rehabilitation efforts
coordinated with the prooerty owners." (n. 18)
That letter was just an inquiry to find out what Mr. Walton
could expect in the wav of rehabilitation in the property
itself, not really knowing what to exoect.
On the 23rd day of June, 1975, a form letter was
sent out to all gravel pit operators, one of which was sent
-6-
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to Fife Rock

0

roducts, outlining the salient noints of the

Davis Countv Excavation Ordinance, which would be required
of all operators, particularly demanding a plan be submitted
("'. 19).
On Aug. 8, 1975, Mr. Joseph L. Moore, Davis County
Planning Commission Director, sent a letter and enclosed
a copy of Plaintiff-Apoellant's letter and requested that
they arrange an appointment for discussions pertaining
thereto (P. 20).
Bv the Fife letter on February 12, 1976, it was apparent
that one new topographical mao was submitted indicating
the existing contour and showing ".

.the areas in which

we nerformed minor sucplemental contour sloping .
r-ie believe this action fulfills our previous commit with
vour office

concerning this area."

He then went on to

include the l(g) clause of the judgment, Civil No. 11601,
taken from the second nage of P.2.
Thereafter, Mr. Joseph Moore, apcarentlv unsatisfied
with the response of Defendant-Respondent, sent a memorandum
to Glen Austin asking him to review the submitted rehabilitation
Dlans or documents and to do his own study as to whether
or not slope requirements had been met, whether there
was any storm runo:t:f, and describing rehabilitation contours
with no depressions, further requesting a field trio and
reouesting notification of when said field trio would be
taken ("'. 22).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The field trip was taken in the spring when the
ground surface could be studied without snow and the ef ~ects
of winter.

That trip was taken on May 28, 1976, and a reDort

was made by Mr. H. Glen Austin, Davis Countv Engineer,
on the "rehabilitation of the now vacated Fife
at the east end of the Walton Property"
Exhibit A, attached herewith}.

~ravel

Pit,

(P. 23, see also

The contents of this menorandum

from "!r. Glen Austin was put in a letter dated June 3, 1?76
to Fife Rock Products, Defendant-Resoondent (P. 24).
The last statement of the said letter was ""'lease consider
and act upon these statements as soon as possible.

I~

you have anv questions, please contact our office."
STA~E

OP 'HMO OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDEnT

It is obvious from the corresoondence between Fife and
the Davis Countv "lanning Conunission tha.t at least Fife and
probably Kenneth F. Walton had no intent at any time to
perform any more than 3 days worth of caterpillar 'vork to
rehabilitate the preMises and thRt thev were not reallv
intent on complying with the objectives of the Davis Countv
Excavation Ordinance of 1960 (ry. 3).

mhe obvious objective

of the Davis County Excavation Ordinance is the restoration
or rehabilitation of excavation onerations within the

a

unincorporated areas of Davis County, emphasizing as it
doe~

a point in time at the end of the excavation ooerations.

In this respect it is the same as the judgment of October 23'
1969, which looks to a point in time at the termination
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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b

0

of the lease.

As an aid to the rehabilitation effort,

Chapter 6 of the said ordinance, the owner or operator
prior to the commencement of the excavation was required
to submit a plan for rehabilitation and specifications were
therein provided (P. 3, page 5).

The said ordinance on

page 1, Chapter 2, under Enforcement and continuing on
page 2, state\ that "in the performance of the duty to enforce
the zoning, the building inspector may enter actions in the
courts, where necessary .

. and his failure to do so shall

not legalize any violations of such provisions."

(Emohasis

added)
0

robably too much emphasis at trial was put upon the

fact that defendants never submitted a rehabilitation plan
or that they submitted a plan which was never accepted
formally or in fact never rejected formally.

This particular

issue is not really probative of the basic issue of whether
or not the Defendants-Respondents in fact, at the termination
of the lease and at the conclusion of the excavation operations
filled their responsibility to comply with Davis County
Planning Commission requirements with respect to terracing,
surfacing, and filling in large holes and caverns.

The

issue of whether or not Defendant-Respondents submitted
a rehabilitation plan at most is only probative of their
intent or negligence or their state of mind pertaining
to their obligations with regard to the pit.

Every piece

of correspondence from Davis County Planning Commission

-9-
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J

to the Defendant-Respondents during the course of time in
question,referring to the Defendant-Respondents' obligations
to comply with the

ordinance,~akes

reference to the fact

that the rehabilitation plan has not been submitted and one
must be submitted (P. 4, P. 5, P. 6, P. 9, P. 10, P. 15,
P. 20, P. 21, P. 25).
Defendant-Respondents take the position that P. 11,
the copy of which is attached herewith as Exhibit B, which
is a letter dated October 7, 1971, together with defendants
Exhibit 3, constitutes a plan that was accepted and they
based their argument upon the fact that P. 12, P. 13, and P. 14,
which are documents indicating a certificate of occupancy, which
was issued subject to filing of a $10,000 bond, was in
fact a constructive acceptance of the rehabilitation
plan.

One must quickly note that the latest document thev

are referring to is a certificate of occuoancv issued and
approved the 3rd day of December, 1971 (P. 14) but however
was followed by a letter of the 7th day of December, 1971,
4 days later, wherein the Planning Director, Rodney F. Sutton,
.

makes an additional demand that rehabilitation plan be submitted.
(P. 15)

I

I

Over the objection of Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel, the I

hearsay statements of Mr. Sutton, the Planning Director,

I

allegedly made October through December of 1971, were admitted.
Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel objected to statements because
they were hearsay and not admissible under any exception
to the Hearsay Rule and also because it was inadmissible
-10-
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I~

under the Statute of Frauds (T. 296, 298).

The substance

of the telephone conversation reveals that Mr. Sutton was
still rather adamant on having a plan submitted when in
oaraphrasing the conversation Mr. Woodland testified,
.He told me that he felt that because the ordinance
said plan, he had to have something in his files to fulfill
that provision."

(T. 299, line 1-3)

Apparently Mr. Woodland

countered with the argument that he has no knowledge of
what depth they were going to be excavating and therefore
could not submit such a plan, but still Mr. Sutton recorded:
"That was basically it, and he still insisted that he
have a plan of some sort, so I told him at that time
that I would submit to him a sketch indicating the
general contours that I felt might be usable, and allow
that to be submitted to his file.
(T. 300)
What follows was the objectionable oortion of the
hearsay statement, which is also inadmissable because it is
in violation of the Statute of Frauds.

Q.

What did he say?

A.
In substance, he said, "That ought to do; that's
okay."
At this point in time the defendant's Exhibit No. 4 was
submitted into evidence, which is a sketch of contours that
~1r.

Woodland prepared.
The defendant further claimed that from the date of

this last conversation and the submission of the sketch
drawings there was no further mention made of a rehabilitation
9lan bv ~r. Sutton or the defendant and no further mention
"as made to it until 197 5, following the terrnina tion of
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the lease.

Whether or not a rehabilitation plan was ever

submitted and whether or not a rehabilitation plan was
ever accepted and in fact whether the Davis County Planning
commission ever acquiesced in the requiring of a rehabilitation
plan or whether by their failure to object they contructively
accepted the rehabilitation plan of the Defendant-Respondent,
is· an:· issue

probative only of the state of mind of the

defendant with regard to the submission of the rehabilitation
plan.

The main issue remains as to whether or not in fact

rehabilitation was accomplished as a termination of the case.
It was always the position in the correspondence and even
in these conversations with Mr. Sutton that a full rehabilitatio~:

I

plan indicating what would be done at the end or what the
contours might remain at the conclusion of the lease were
held in abeyance and by the correspondence of the DefendantRespondent Fife and Mr. Woodland, of Fife Rock Products
Construction Company, was that full rehabilitation plans would
be submitted at the conclusion of the lease and/or that
the site would be left in the condition to meet all requirements
set up by the State (T. 299-300, P. 5 "It is our intention
to proceed with our planned rehabilitation as soon after
the court renders its decision as is feasible."

P. 9

"Our rehabilitation plans therefore remain in the future
and will be done when our operations there are complete."
The purported rehabilitation plan, the letter of October 7,
1971, P. 11 "The contours to which the pit will be excavated
-12-
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prior to rehabilitation are not known at this time.

Test

holes do not indicate the depth to which usable material
exists.")

This was reemphasized again in the conversation

with Mr. Sutton as the rationale for not submitting a completed
or finished rehabilitation plan.

Under Chaper 6 of the

Excavation Ordinance of 1960 (P. 3, page 5, Sec. 1-6-l(d)
one of the requirements is a plan showing proposed contours
after rehabilitation, which appears to be a difficult
question to answer in submitting a plan.
Again,

(ii a plan was not submitted which would cover

all requirements necessary under the ordinance;

(ii)

it

was the intent of the narty, Defendant-Respondent Fife,
to comply at the conclusion of the excavation;
Judgment

(iii) the

of October 23, 1969 and the prior stipulation

from which the Judgment was taken dated July 7, 1967
refer to a point in time at the conclusion of the excavation
for action to be taken by the Defendant-Respondent.
EXPERT

S~UDIES

The Plaintiff-Appellant, after

l~arriing

of the

defici~ncies

as found by Glen Austin and himself being concerned about
the rehabilitation of the property, employed the services
of an engineering firm, Byrd Engineering, and the President
of said company, Mr. Jim Byrd, employed the services of
~r.

Herbert Schreiter as a land planner who in turn employed

the services of Mr. Guy Alder, who is a specialist in
reveqetation.

It was

~r.

Schreiter's responsibility to
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study the area to determine what needed to be done.

Mr.

schreiter went into the area using an instrument called
an abney to measure slopes and a camera to take pictures
and he followed a map provided for him by the plaintiff
which was a map duly authenticated and admitted to evidence.
He had the Exhibit 25, the aerial photo of the gravel pit
and based upon his knowledge and experience of soil tyµes
and unstable soils and conditions, Mr. Schreiter produced
several descriptive overlay charts constituting plaintiff's
Exhibits 26-31.

P. 26 describes a general condition of

sandy, gravel, cobbly type of material and together with
Exhibit 27 it indicates that said materials are in some cases
on extremely steep slopes.

~.

28 indicates that those slopes

are not covered by any vegetation as to the present time and
P. 29 and 29a indicate that there are approximately 29.8
acres in need of grading and revegetation ranging from
moderately severe to severe conditions which could result
in erosion problems.

Exhibit No. 30 describes the areas

where slopes are rather steep, ranging from 40-60% slopes
down to a 0-5% slope.
Mr. Byrd and Byrd Engineering produced what is called
a Cut and Fill Proposal and described it graphically on

P. 36.

By his estimation, there it was 143,326 cubic

yards of material that must be removed to return the property
to any kind of a usable condition.

Mr. Byrd indicated that

he had prior to developing this plan developed a more ideal
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type of plan which would have required approximately
100,000 yards more of fill to fill up the holes that
exist but had decided to adopt a more conservative approach,
which is the approach which he took (T. 217) which amounted
to 143,326 cubic yards

(T. 216).

Nor would this more

conservative plan which ~r. Byrd arrived at toward the
development of a subdivision be more extravagant than any
other kind of excavation purpose or objective.

(T. 214)

Mr. Byrd believes in his experience that the cost of moving
the material would be approxiamtely 75¢ on the average
per cubic yard, and that multiplied by the yardage of
143,326 cubic yards is the projected cost for reshaping the

ground.
Mr.

(T. 216-217)
~uy

Michael Alder, President of Native Plants, Inc.,

a licensed nurseryman, landscape contractor, and holding
an undergraduate degree in botany, a master's degree in
biological science, specializing in plant ecology, who had
just returned from Colorado after having received a Rocky
Mountain Center Environment Industry Award was called to
testify as to the needs for rehabilitation of the property.
Mr. Alder testified that where there had been no reshaping
of the slopes and terracing during the course of the excavation,
that would be necessary prior to revegetation.

In Transcript

page 233, he further testified how it could have been accomplished
during the excavation with minimal effort.

(T. 2 3 4)

He

stated that whatever the degree of slope, it may or may
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not check erosion, but the checking of erosion is the main
purpose behind rehabilitation of property after mining
and excavation.

(T. 235)

He then testified concerning materials needed and used
to check erosion.

He used a process which was less expensive

in that there was no spreading of soil.

In place of soil

there would be mulch and tacking material.

(T. 237)

The

estimated cost for the revegetation was $2,960 per acre
and this multiplied by 29+ acres would be the total rehabilita+
costs of the revegetation, and this would be separate and
apart from the reshaping costs.

(T. 241)

Whatever the

case, the reshaping alone would not accomplish the task
without revegetation.

(T. 242)

Mr. Burke 0. Clegg, a real estate appraiser with an
SRA professional designation, was called to testify, who
did a "check feasability study."

(T. 261)

He analyzed

all of plaintiff's property, including the lower portion
(westerly) and the higher impacted gravel pit area (easterly)
and described the effects of the eastern gravel pit area on
the western property, stating that the higher propertv
would have an adverse effect on the marketability of the
lower area simply because of its condition.
It was his opinion that parcel 1 was affected as follows:
(i) If it remained as it was, it would be worth approximately
$3000 per acre;

(ii) If the above eastern portion were

impro~

and in a better condition, it ~ould increase the value
of the western lower property, making it worth approxima tel:1
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c

$10,000 per acre, and there being 35 acres, it would be a

difference between $350,000 and $35,000 (See T. 267 and 276)
After hearing the testimony of Mr. Smith, who was purported
to have done the rehabilitation work for the 3 days referred
to above, Mr. Alder retook the witness stand as a rebuttal
witness and testified that the procedures followed could
not have possibly done the job.

(T. 394 and 395)

Counsel for the plaintiff, realizing that one last
detail should be provided for the court, i.e. the standard
that was required of Davis County Planning Commission of
excavating by gravel pit operators on or about May 18,
1975, attempted to call Mr. Joseph Moore back to

the witness stand as a rebuttal witness but was unable to
do so in that Mr. Moore was not available.

Plaintiff asked

that a deposition of Mr. Moore be admitted into evidence,
which would accomplish the testimony and Mr. King objected
to the deposition on the grounds that there is no showing
the witness was outside the jurisdiction of the court or
otherwise unavailable within the meaning of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which objection was sustained.
Thereafter, the Court issued its judgment and its
memorandum decision (R. 28) finding no cause of action in
favor of both Kenneth Walton and Fife Rock Products and
Construction Company.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed his

·~otion

for a New Trial and for an opportunity to rebut the facts
as found by the Court pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure, but that motion was denied.
R. 47)

(R. 44 and

The motion was brought as it states because the Court

had found,
"This ordinance (Excavation Ordinance of 1960) was
never enforced so far as the provisions "rehabilitation
of landn were involved, but was enforced as to dust
noise, and other factors."
The Court further found,
"The Planning Commission has never, during the period
of time in question requested the submission of a
rehabilitation plan of any gravel mine except the
defendant Fife in this case, and thisV 2quest was
made at plaintiff ~alton's insistence.•
The intent behind putting Mr. Moore back on the witness
stand as a rebuttal witness had been to rebut that position
that had been advanced by the defendant.

Being unable

to do so during trial, plaintiff moved for an opportunity
to rebut under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Having denied the motion, the Court turned its back on
further facts which could have aided in overcoming those
assumptions upon which the Court had made its findings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS' JUDGMENT IS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT IS BASED UPotl A
THEORY OF ESTOPPEL OF A ~OVERNMENTAL
AGENCY WHICH IS NOT POSSIBLE U!JDER
THE LAVi.
The Court made reference to the provision in judgment
of October 23, 1969 (P. 1, page 2) under DaragraDh l(g)
wherein the Court held that Kenneth l'i'al ton was, upon terminati'
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of said lease obligated to "comply with requirements of
Davis County :Olanning Commission with respect to terracing"
and to see to it that there are no large caverns or holes
left upon the premises.

The Court stated that that particular

provision was a judgment which continued on the relationshio
that started in 1955 and
.that the obligation of terracing, etc. would
affect not only the diggings taking place after 1967
when the stipulation was made or 1969 when the judgment
was entered, but also dates back to 1955 when the
digging was first begun in so far as Kenneth F'. Walton
is concerned.·•
(R. 38)
These provisions in the judgment together with the
ordinance (P. 3) as well as the defendants themselves always
look to the future at the end of the excavation to determine
their obligations and to plan out the rehabilitation of
the gravel pit.
The Court, however, in its Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated that:
(5)
This ordinance (Excavation Ordinance of 1960)
was never enforced insofar as the provisions
"rehabilitation of lands" were inv~lved, but was enforced
as to dust, noise, and other factors.
(7)
The request was made by the former Director
of the Davis County Planning Commission, now deceased,
for "something to be put in the file" and was not
carefully examined or considered by the Davis Countv
Planning Commission, and no action was taken by the
Davis County Planning Commission within the thirty (30)
davs allowe~ by the ordinance to disapprove such a
plan, and therefore the submitted rehabilitation plan
by letter of Fife Rock Products Company of October 7,
1971 and material subseouently submitted in connection
therewith must be deemed to have been accepted by
the Davis County Planning Commission as a "rehabilitation
olan."
-19-
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(8)
The Fife "rehabilitation clan" referred to above
did satisfy the then existing standards and was accepted
bv the Davis County Planning Commissions lack of
action after the period of time required by the
Ordinance as referred to above.
(11)
The Court finds that the mining in Question was
done in accordance with the then prevailinq customs
and usage' in the mining field and that there is no
waste per se proven in this case.
(14)
* * *
. Such a theory of action requires
that a scar on the surface of the mountain be left in
violation of the law as the law then existed and also
in violation of the prevailing general then in existence.
The Court, however, in this case does not find that such
was oroven, but does, in fact, find that the rehabilitatio:
of lands were in accordance with the then prevailing
standards of 1975 in Davis County area and throughout
the general area of the Wasatch front and, therefore,
also in accordance with the judgment of October 23,
1969.
The Court is outlining by the above reference statements,
the theory of estoppel, which,' in essence states that Davis
County Planning Commission is estopped in 1975 to demand
rehabilitation of the property because they have, prior
to that time, through their inaction, lulled the defendant,
Fife, into believing that their conduct was acceptable
and that the defendant, Fife, thereby relied upon said
inaction and therefore, Davis County Planning Commission
is now estooped to demand performance under the Davis County
Excavation Ordinance.
Estoppels against the oublic are little favored.
They should not be invoked exceot in rare and unusual
circumstances, and mav not be i~voked where they will
operate to defeat the-effective operation of the policies
adopted to protect the public.
(31 C.J.S. Estoopel,
Sec. 138, p. 675)
If estoppel is permitted at anv time against a governmenta

-20-
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agency, it would be in respect to matters which are proprietary
or private enterprise types of matters as opposed to
governmental or public matters.

~here

is no auestion but

what the Davis County Planning Commission was not the owner
of any property from which it could be concluded they were
acting in a Proprietary function, but were, in fact, using
mere police powers.
As is sometimes stated, eauitable estoppel mav be
invoked against the United States, a s~~te, a-municiPal
corporation, or other governmental agency or instrumentality
in respect to acts done in its proprietary or private
capacity, as is distinguished from its governmental
or oublic caoacity in its strict scone of which it
cannot be estopped
(31 C.J.S. Sec. 138, p.676-677)
If the Court found that this was the proprietary
function, it would still not constitute estoppel under the
circumstances and the facts in this case.

The defendants

could not be said to have relied upon any representation
action or inaction of the agency, especially under the
circumstances where the ordinance clearly describes what
their duties and responsibilities are and further where the
ordinance stated under Chapter 2, Enforcement 1-2-2:
Where it is determined by the zoning and building
inspector that excavation is proceeding not in comPliance
with the provisions of this ordinance, he shall
enforce the Provisions of this ordinance, and in
Performance of his duty, may enter actions in the court,
where necessarv and his failure to do so shall not legalize
any violations" of such provisions.
(P. 3, page 2)
(Emphasis added)
Nor is there any estoppel against a governmental
agency notwithstanding the oroprietarv finding where:
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. . . such agencies lack the essential knowledge or
intent or where the person claiming estonpel did not
rely, or should not have relied, upon the representation
action or inaction of the agency as where the person
asserting the estopoel was not misled, or where he
could have learned the facts by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or where he was not injured as a result
of the act or statement of the government body.
Furthermore, there can no estoppel where the oerson
setting it up failed to act in good faith; and no amount
of representation can prevent the government from
asserting as illegal that which the law declares to
be such.
(31 C.J.S. Sec. 133 p. 683-685)
So it is that estoopel is not a proper theorv to bring
against the government or its agencies in failing to act
or to enforce the law or in any way to void the law in its
effect and sancion upon any oerson.

The Supreme Court

o~

the State of Utah has by their decisions supported this
view that where city officials or governmental officials
failed to act as they should in their position estoppel
would not serve as a defense to anv rights and uowers exercisec
We find the exact same situation as is being charged by
the Defendant-Respondents in this case.

In the case of

Tooele City vs. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406, the
city of Tooele, State of Utah, sought to quiet title to a
strip of land alleged to have been dedicated as an
allev.

There were a number of conveyances in reference

to said property, beginning in ,July of 1872 and continuing
on to March of 1938.

In each and every convevance, the city

plat was recognized as the legal description of the property.
The defendants and appellants based their titles of propertv
uoon two grounds,

(1) the city had deeded them the nroperty

of the quick claim deed and thereby relinquished all right
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the city might have had in the property and (2) the property
was never owned nor dedicated as an alley by the city and
if it did have any rights in the property they have long
since been waived and lost.

The alley or property had never

been open to the Public as a public thoroughfare.

The

Court held that the property had been dedicated as a street
and therefore could not have been conveyed in 1938 to the
defendants and also the mere failure to have implemented
the use of the said alleyway as a street by officers who
should act within the authority granted could not be reasons
for abrogating the community interest.

For those reasons,

the argument of estoppel in pais could not be claimed as
against the city.

(Ibid. page 410)

A similar case arose in the case of Cox vs. Carlisle.
(369 P.2d 1049)

Plaintiff-Appellant claimed to have acquired

title over the manv many years from the date the said property,
a 66-foot strip of land was deeded to the city of Manti on
September 2, 1872. Since that year, plaintiff and her predecessor
had made improvements in connection with the area.

Notwith-

standing, these improvements and the use of the property the
court held that the mere fact that the government over
the many years permitted plaintiff the use thereof did
not work as an estoppel against the government in claiming
the interest and ownership of said property.

There were

various reasons given, including the fact that neither
nlaintiff nor others had ever paid any taxes on the property
-23-
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since or before 1831 and Manti has claimed no taxes thereon.
In this particular case, silence and inaction by the city
of Manti did not abrogate its right and claims to said
property and therefore the estoppel argument did not lie
against the City of Manti.
In the case of Morgan vs. Board of State Lands,
(549 P.2d 695)

~organ

(1976)

had an oil shale land lease for

a period of ten years and at the expiration of the ten vears
received another rent notice and paid the same.

The Board

of State Lands thereafter attempted to terminate the lease
or claim or treat it as terminated and the Utah Supreme Court
held that, notwithstanding the Board's mistake in issuing
the rental notice and their failure to publish the regulations
pertaining to the renewal of leases and their otherwise
negligent acquiescence or iriaction and notwithstandirig the
lessee relied thereon, the said Board of State Lands
is not estopped from denying extension of the said lease
for another ten years.

Again this case stands for the

proposition that public officials may not perform their duty
and responsibility.

Notwithstanding that inaction of failure,

it cannot be held that said government body is estopped
from enforcing the regulations or laws which they are entitled
to enforce.

These arguments and theories have been clearly

set out in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 138,

P.

686-688·

Mere acquiescence, laches laose of time, or nonaction
on the oart of the public or the public agent or
officer does not ordinarily work an estoppel. No
1

-24-
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estoppel ordinarily results from acquiescence in the
violation of law and it has been held that no estopoel
results ordinarily from the failure to collect feesor from delay in bringing suit.
POINT II
AN ESTOPPEL AGAINST A THIRD PERSON
FOR INACTION OR AC(IUIESCENCE MY
NOT WORK AS AN ESTOPPEL UPON THE
PARTY PLAINTIFF IN HIS ACTION
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
It is indeed a pecul!iar

doctrine that Mr. Paul Walton

must be held to have his rights of action rise or fall upon
the conduct of a third party over whom he has no control.
Paul Walton, never at any time by his own contact led the
defendant, Fife or Kenneth Walton to believe that they could
sit back and fail to comply with the ordinance.

The court

should look to the myriads of correspondence surrounding
the termination of the lease and the demands and requirements
imposed by Davis County Planning Commission.

Mr. Joseph

Moore stated that his action in this case was due to other
pressures beyond the case involving Mr. Walton's property and
that he was in fact imposing the same controls and requirements
upon all excavations throughout the county.
page 93, line 24 through page 94 line 7)
~alton

(T. 66 lines 10-14,

So it is that Mr.

did not play any part in the inaction on the part of

Davis County Planning Commission, their enforcement of the
nrdinance at the time nor any detriment which mav have worked
upon Defendant-Respondent.
The most important factor, however, is that estoppel
-25-
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which the Court has obviously imposed upon Davis County
Planning commission is working to the detriment of the
Plaintiff-Appellant, who was not a party to the conduct or
to any inaction of the part of the Planning Commission.
As stated, it seems improbable that the evidence will indicate
that Mr. Paul F. lflalton at any time ratified the action
of Davis County Planning Commission when, in fact, the judgment
itself speaks of a time at the termination of the lease
as of May 18, 1975 when the property is to be surfaced
and terraced in compliance with Davis County 1? lanning Commissio:
requirements.

Mr. Walton was not in a position to police and

control what went on with regard to the gravel pit and was
otherwise entitled himself to rely upon the Ordinance and
its enforcement.
Otherwise, the Davis County Planning Commission stands
between Mr. Walton and Fife Rock Products and Kenneth F.
Walton and the only way that estoppel could operate between
Kenneth F. T'1alton, Fife Rock Products and the plaintiff would
be by some notion of a "third party beneficiary estoppel"
which is a notion totally foreign or alien to the law.
Persons to whom representatives are directed and
whose conduct thay-are intended to, and do, influence
may take advantage of a plea of estoppel.

*

*

*

Estoppels operate as to or between, and as to or between
the parties to the subject matter or transaction which
is the basis of the estoppel and their privies, either
in blood, in estate, or in law.
(31 C.J.S. EStopoel,
sec. 130, p. 661-662)
-26-
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Estoppels in pais are available against parties
in privity, whether the privity be by blood, by estate,
or by contract, provided the privity is create~ after
the event out of which the estoppel arises.
(31 C.J.S.
Estoppel, Sec. 131, p. 665-666)
There is no privity of contract or privity of relationship
out of which an estoppel may arise between Paul F. !<Talton and
the defendants herein because of the intervening relationship
of Davis County Planning Commission.

If there were a possible

law of estoppel against the governmental agency (which
there is not) or if the courts should by some notion find
there was a proorietary function or some legal basis upon
which estoppel could be asserted against Davis County Planning
Commission, it would still be defective because there
exists no relationship out of which the said estoppel arose
between Plaintiff-Appellant herein and Defendants-Respondent.

DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR Ril;HT TO
ASSERT DEFENSE OF ESTOPPEL BY FAILING
TO PLEAD ESTOPPEL UNDER RULE 8 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OR TO
MOVE AFFIR'1ATIVELY UPON THE SAID DEFENSE
PRIOR TO TRIAL. AS A RESULT THE SAID
DEFENSE !VAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT, AND
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ON ITS 01•7N CREATE
SUCH A DEFENSE IN ITS JUDGMENT.
If the court were able to suppress the above referred
to points of law and find that estoppel was available
as a defense, said estoppel is an affirmative defense
and should have been pleaded affirmatively under Rule 8
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:
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(c)
Affirmative Defenses.
In oleading to a preceeding
pleading, the parties shall set forth affirmatively
accord and satisfaction arbitration award, assumntion
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge and
bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata. statute of
fraud, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting avoidance or affirmative defense.
(Emphasis added)
This was not alleged affirmatively and therefore, was
not a matter before the Court, nor did this defense arise
as a result of any defense under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Every defense in law or fact, to claim full relief
in anv nleading, whether a claim, counter claim,
cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted
in the responsive pleading thereto if one is reauired.
(h)
Naiver of Defenses. A oartv waives all defenses
and objections which he does-not oresent either bv
motion as herein before orovided or if he has made
no motion in his answer or reply
Having not either pleaded the theory of

estop~el

as

an affirmative defense or having entered into a motion
to assert that evidence said defense was waived.
POIN'!' IV
TRIAL COURT ~msT LOOK TO THE DE.''!ANDS
OF DAVIS COUNTY PL_l\NNING CQr1Jl'ISSION
SUBSEQUENT TO MAY 18, 1975 BECAUSE
THIS IS THE "'I'1E SE'J' AS llE\'? CONSIDERATIOH
ON l')R ABOUT ,JULY 7 I 1%7 IN ".'HE 01'.AL
STIPULATI01'J ''7HICH '·IAS P.EDUCRD '1'0 ,TTJD"'IBNT
ON OCTOBER 23, 1969 A".'!D AS NEToJ CO"TSIDERA'!'IO~T
THE ORIGINAL OBLI~ATIONS OP THE PARTIES
11ERE CHANGED.
It should be noted at this point that whether or not
a rehabilitation plan was submitted is reallv irrelevant

-23-
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in that it is not orobative as to the renuirements imposed
upon the defendant to rehabilitate under the stipulation
and judgment.

At most, it is only probative of the issue

whether or not the defendants were negligent or were of
a state of mind not to perform as they were suonosed to
under the Excavation Ordinance of 1960 and/or obey the
Planning Commission requirements as thev were made or demanded
during the years.

One must consider the intent or nurpose

of the rehabilitation plan to aid both the defendants and
the Davis County Planning Commission in determining what
the outcome of the excavation would be and to guide the said
oarties to a proper and agreeable conclusion.
New consideration amounted to a 10-year extension
of the existing lease to the benefit of defendants.

New

consideration accruing to plaintiff's benefit was and is
set forth in the following

language~

FROM THE ORAL STIPULATION OF cTULY 7, 1967:

FO«.BES · That when the lease terminates, that he
so surface and terrace the land to comnlv with the
requirements of the Davis County Planning Commission,
but specifically that there be left no large caverns
or holes.

11R.

FROM THE JUDr:;MEN':' OF OC"'.'OBER 2 3 '

19 6 9 :

1. (g) that upon the termination of said lease, Defendant
shall comply with the reauirements of the Davis Countv
Planning Commission with respect to terracing and
will soecificallv see to it that there are no large
caverns or holes' left uoon the premises.
Included within the new consideration established
in the ,Julv 7, 1967 oral stioulation would be all the
-29-
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demands or requirements imposed by the Davis Countv Planning
commission in terracing and surfacing and filling in all
large holes and caverns as those needs may be discovered
following May 18, 1975.
POP\IT V
THE DEFENDANT FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IS ALSO LIABLE
UNDER THE LEASE AS IT T'7AS ~10DP"'IED
BY THE ORAL STIPULATION OF JULY 7,
1967 AND THE OCTOBER 23, 1969
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RELATIONSHIP
BETT•7EEN THE DE"'ENDANTS HEREIN WAS
THAT OF ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE
INSTEAD OF THAT OF A SUBLESSOR
AND SUBLESSEE.
Where (al a tenant sublets all of his interest to
his subtenant, or (bl by his conduct transfers all of his
interest to a subtenant and {c) the sublease terminates
at the same time as the original lease with no reversion
back to the tenant, the legal relationship between the
tenant and the subtenant is assignment instead of a sublease
which will establish obligations and ?rivitv of contract
between a landlord and assignee or subtenant.
It is generallv recognized that an assignment of
a term for years occurs where the lessee transfers
his entire interest therein without retaining any
reversionary interest.
If an instrument so transfers
the lessee's interest, it constitutes an assignment,
regardless of its character and form; and it is
freouentlv been so held where the instrument of
transfer is in the form of a lease, a sublease or a
conveyance by the lessee of the oremises bv deed and
fee, or by a-quick claim deed, or by deliverv of the
lease to the past signee, dulv endorsed to him, the
endorsement reciting the transfer of all the lessee's
right, title, and interest in the lease.
~evertheless,

-30-
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in order to constitute an assignment, the lessee must
part with his entire interest in the whole or in
oart of the premises.
(51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenants,
Sec. 31(1) p. 103-104)
It is further an estoppel to deny assignment when
the conduct of the parties is such that it constitutes
an assignment instead of a lease.
Estoppel to Deny Assignment. Conduct inconsistent
with another relation may estop a person to deny that
there has been an assignment of the terms. (P. 104)
An example of the existence of an assignment of a lease
rather than a sublease is demonstrated by the situation
which the third party, sublessee, undertakes the rights
and obligations of the original lease with the consent of
the lessor.

In the case of Ernst vs. Conditt 54 Tenn. Aoo.

328, 390 S.W. 2d 703, the third party undertook rights
and obligations under the lease with the consent of the
lessor, and the Court held that the agreement constituted
and assignment of the lease, rather than a sublease,
notwithstanding the lessee agreed to remain personally
liable for performance of covenant and the lessor consented
to the agreement.

In the case at bar, the evidence showed

that Fife undertook to discharge all the obligations of
Kenneth F. Walton by even taking upon himself the requirement
to fill the Court's order as set forth in the Judgment of
October 23, 1969.

In so doing, thev wrote a letter to Davis

County Planning Commission in which they recognized the
judgment and the terms of the judgment as thev related
Kenneth F. Walton and themselves stated that this was
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their comrnittment.

(P.21)
POINT VI

THE DEFENDANT, ~IPE ROCK PRODUCTS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, COMMITTED ''lASTE
PER SE AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF BY
VIOLATING A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
AND/OR REQUIRE'1ENTS OF' DAVIS COUNTY
PLANNING COM-1'HSSIO~J
WASTE DEFINED
The

ela~ents

essential to a cause of action for waste

are as follows:
1.

The waste statute creates for the Plaintiff-

Appellant herein his cause of action in tort.

The duty

established is one of due care not to injure the property
of any person who has a legal interest in property legallv
in the possession of the tortfeasor.
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant
or tenant in corrunon of real property commits waste
thereon, any person aggrieved by the waste may bring
an action against him therefore, in which action there
may be a judgment for treble damages. (Emnhasis added)
{U .C .A. 78-28-2 (1953)
This particular provision falls under Chapter 28 of
Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated which deals with Torts
to Real Property and is entitled "Nuisance, Waste, and Other
Damage.''

There are only four verses to this Chanter 38,

the title of Verse 1 is "Nuisance".
one is "Waste".

The title of the second

The title of the third is "Injury to

Trees-Damage'', and the fourth is "Limited Damages in Certain
Cases".

These three sections use common phrases.

!"or

example, in 78-38-1 we read ''any person whose property
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is injuriously affected" and 73-38-2 "any cerson aggrieved
by the waste",

and in 78-38-3 "any person

to the owner of such land.

. is liable

It is noted from these

sections and particular section 73-28-2 that the tort
against property does not depend upon a prior existing
legal relationship but is like any other tort action in
which the cause of action arises due to the conduct of the
one party which is negligent or intentional or in other
words breaches some duty due and owing to the owner of the
property which results in injury to the said property.
So it is in nuisance that the action is based ucon smell,
escapage of water, and myriad of other kinds of noxious,
indecent or offensive acts which any person in use of their
own property adjacent or nearby the property of the complainant
which results in damage or injury to the said complainant's
property.

The question of privity of contract is an irrelevant

principle to the concept of torts.
2.

The act constituting waste must have been done

by one legally in possession, and that act must be to the

prejudice of the estate or interest therein of another.
(Jody vs. Guerdin 10 Ariz. App. 205, 457 P.2d 45

(1969)

. . . it mav be defined to be an unlawful act or an
admission of duty on the part of the tenant which results
in a permanent injury to the interitance.
It is a
violation of an obligation to treat the premises in
such a manner that no harm be done to them and that
the estate mav revert to those having an underlying
interest undeteriorated by any willful or negligent
act. (93 C.J.S. ~aste Sec. 1, p. 559-560; Dorsev vs.
Soeelman, 1 ''lash . .Z\.pc. 85, 459 ?.2d 416 (1969).
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LANDLORD VS. SUBTENANT
The proposition that waste is a cause of action which
may be brought against the subtenant by the olaintiff,
Paul F. Walton, who is the remainder-man, who currently
owns the property as a result of its reversion to him is
further supported by 93 C.J.S. Waste, Sec. 11 wherein we read
Waste by Assignee, Subtenant, or Licensee.
Thus one who enters by authority or permission of
or under a contract with, the tenant, is liable to
the remainderman for waste, and may be enjoined on
his petition. (P. 567)
The United States District Court, for the Southern
District of Mississippi held in an action by a remainderman
against a lessee, Humble Oil and Refining Company, the defendan'.
as a purchaser from the life tenant or trustee, was charged
with knowledge about the powers of the remainderman and his
interest and the plaintiff was held to have the right of
action against said

subtenant for the value of all minerals

and properties extracted from the property.

(Martin vs.

Humble Oil and Refining Company 199 Fed. Sup. 648
p. 651)

(1960)

The Court said:

. . a life tenant is charged with notice of the extent
of the life tenancv and of the right of the tenant
to deal with the p~operty, and if the life tenant
exceeds his authority the one purchasing from him
is not relieved from the obligation to resoond to
damages to the remainderman for waste .
This was a case in which the defendant, Humble Oil
and ~efining Company, was being sued and the rel~tionshio
with the remainderman ~1artin was only that of a tortfeasor
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and the duty arose under a theory of tort since Humble Oil
and Refining Company was a subtenant under the life tenant
with no privy of contract with the remainderrnan.
!1!ASTE PER SE
It is further obvious that the defendants have committed
waste per se against the plaintiff.

In order to prove

a case on waste per se the plaintiff must (i)

show the damage

to the plaintiff was caused by negligence in failing to
obey an ordinance which was created for the ourpose of
protecting individuals like the plaintiff and (ii) that
the said violation was the cause of plaintiff's injury
or damage.

It must (iii)

further show that the conduct

of the defendant, Fife Rock Products Construction Company
was such that it could not be excused or justified.
(Christensen vs. Lelas Automatic Transmission Service, Inc.,
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970); Klafta vs. Smith,
17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P.2d 659

(1965); Thompson vs. Ford Motor

Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 ?.2d 62

(1964); Ellis vs. Hale,

13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962); Arbuckle vs. Wasatch
Land and Improvement Companv, 120 Utah 338, 234 P.2d
697 (1951); Hidalgo vs. Cochise County, 13 Ariz. App. 27,
474 P.2d 34

(1970); Routh vs. Ouinn, 20 C. 2d 488 127 P.2d

1 (1942); Curtis vs. O.R.S. Neon Corporation, 147 C.A.
2d 186, 305 P.2d 294

(1957); Landbought vs. Pavton, 147

Colo. 207, 363 P.2d 167 (1961); Stachniewicz vs. Mar-Carn
Corporation, 259 Or. 583, 488 n.2d 436

(1971)
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ORDINANCE PROVISIONS VIOLATED
The careful reading of the Ordinance of 1960 controlling
excavation will provide an indication of what the Ordinance
was attempting to accomplish.

Under 1-1-1, entitle "Puroose",

we read that the purpose of the Ordinance is to
"establish . . . safeguards and controls on excavation
within the unincorporated areas of Davis County, and
to insure the excavation operations will be rehabilitated
to a condition of oractical usefulness and reasonable
physical attractiv~ness . . . (and to orovide protection
bf the tax base, provide for the economical ~se of
vital materials necessary for economy and give due
consideration to the present and future use of the
land) in the interest of promoting the public health,
safety, and general welfare. (Emohasis added)
It is obvious that the user of this land will be
Mr. Paul F. Walton, the individual to whom the land has
reverted.

(P. 3, p. 1)

Under the Chapter 5 of that ordinance,

designated as 1-5-1 and subparagraph (at end)

"Excavation

and Backfilling":
(1) Where backfilling is required, the excavation
shall be graded or backfilled with non-noxious, nonflammable, non-compustible solids. The materials
used or the method of fill shall not be such as to
create a health hazard or which would be objectionable
because of odor or unsightliness.
(2)
The graded or backfilled area shall not collect
and permit stagnant water to remain thereon.
(3)
~he peaks and depressions of the excavation
area shal~reduced to a surface which will result
in level or gently sloping topography in substantial
conformity to the land area immediately surrounding
and which will minimize erosion due to rain fall.
(4)
In any rehabilitation procedure which takes place
in sand and gravel pits or on other sites where the
material is of loose or friable nature, no slope shall
be left which is steener than a ratio of l 1/2 horizontal
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to 1 vertical.
In no case shall anv sloce exceed
the normal angle of repose of the material involved.
(P. 3, p. 4-5) (Emohasis added)
VIOLATIONS CAUSED PLAINTIFF APPELLANTS DAMAGES
The evidence overwhelmingly establishes as a matter of
law that the basic objectives of this Excavation Ordinance
were not achieved by Defendants upon the termination of
the lease.
SLOPES TOO STEEP TO STABILIZE
Glenn Austin, Davis County Engineer, after visiting
the site, May 28, 1976, made a report which indicated that
there was a sand hill upon which the sand was sliding down,
considerable erosion was taking place, there were places
in which there was no vegetation, a general need for storm
drainage control to prevent erosion, and a
of regrading and revegetation.

~~~eral

neea

(P.23, See also the testimony

of the Davis County Planning Commission Director, Joseph
Moore, T. 102 and the testimony of Glenn Austin, the
Davis County Engineer, T. 134-135, Herb Schreiter, T. 184,
192 and Guy Alder, T. 243 lines 17-22, See also photographs
P-38, P-39, and P-48)
EROSION PROBLEMS
After Mr. Austin's review of the property, and his
findings as indicated above a rather comprehensive study
was undertaken by Plaintiff-Appellant using professional
land design planners, vegetation experts and engineers.
Mr. Herbert Schreiter, duly qualified in the field of
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land planning, and designing, made a study of the sight and
took picture of the conditions of the propertv.
enormous erosion problems,

He discovered

(See photographs P-37, P-40,

P-41, P-42, P-43, P-46, and P-50, Also see T. 180, 182,
183, and 189)

Mr. Guy Alder, an eminent authority in the

State of Utah on excavation rehabilitation, and the President
of Native Plants, Incorporated, also employed as an expert
to study the conditions on the site summarized the erosion
problem, stating,
"In my estimation, the complete revegetation of this
site would probably not occur within the duration
that we could predict, because of the erosive forces
that have begun to undercut the natural revegetation
that has occurred. So it would be very difficult for
us to ever assume that the site by itself could
control the erosion that is now undercutting." (T.243)
That which one needs to look to determine if the
Excavation Ordinance of 1960 has been complied with or
violated is whether "the excavation operations (have been
rehabilitated) to a condition of practical usefulness
and reasonable physical attractiveness . . . (providing)
protection of the tax base . . . (giving) due consideration
the present and future use of the land."

(P.3 Chapter 1,

Sec. 1-1-1 Purpose)
More specifically this Honorable Court needs to determine
if the backfilling and "terracing" and "surfacing"

(P.l and

P.2) was accomplished by defendants of whether the property
was left in a condition that was:
(1)

"objectionable . . . (as unsightly)" and whether
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"The graded or backfilled area (was such as to) collect
and permit stagnant water to remain thereon .. ,
(2)
The peaks and deoressions of the excavation area
(were) reduced to a surface which will result in level
or gently slooing topography in conformitv to the
land area immediatelv surrounding and which will minimize
erosion due to rain fall.
(3)
. . (the slopes exceeded) the normal angle
of repose of the material involved.
(P. 3, p. 4-5)
If they were not, the Ordinance was violated.

If the

Ordinance was violated, Defendant-Respondents committed
waste per se.
In determining whether there has been such violation
of a statute or ordinance as mav constitute negligence,
regard must be had to the purnose of the enactment,
the dangers or hazards against which it was intended
to afford protection, and the harm or injuries ,,.,hich
it was intended to prevent or guard against.
INCIDENTAL PURPOSES.
In order that one may be entitled
to the henefit of a statute or ordinance imposing
a dutv, it is not necessary that the nrirnarv purnose
of the enactment should have been to protect him,
but it is sufficient that his protection was one of
the ournoses intended.
(65 C.J.S. Negligence Sec. 19
(5) po. 632-633)
The language of the Ordinance contemplates the orotection
of the user of the land or the "future

use~

of the land,

and therefore should protect Plaintiff-Appellant herein.
If defendant did commit waste per se, the customs and usage
in the industrv will not shelter Defendant-Respondents
from liability under the law.
CUST0~1

A'W

USAGE AS EXCUSE OR .TUSTIFICATION

Custom and usage in the industry is specificallv excluded
as a defense of excuse or justification for violating an
ordinance.

The District Court in its Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law, on page 4, beginning with item 11
and continuing on through item 14 on page 5, states the
following:
11. The Court finds that the mining in question was
done in accordance with the then prevailing customs
and usage in the mining field and that there is no
waste per se proven in this case. (Emphasis added)
12. The Court finds that the mining was lawfully
done and that while the area left is unpleasant
in appearance and might by some future standards
be deemed to be a nuisance if created at a future
date, that the standards at the time the mining was
done and rehabilitation completed were in accordance
with the then existing law and Judgment of October 23,
1969.
(Emphasis added)
13. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper
case, there is a possible cause of action in the hands
of a remainderman for waste committed by a sub-tenant.
However, in this case the Court does not find the
facts supporting such a cause of action.
14. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper
case, a remainderman of even an adjoining landowner
might bring a successful action against a person who
created unsightly scars on a mountain-side and did
not rehabilitate the area so as to comply with the
requirements of law, and thereby might be guilty
of the creation of a nuisance which had a tendencv to
suppress local land values of not only the remainderman but adjoining land users and might be declared
an unlawful nuisance. Of course, such a theorv of
action requires that the scar on the surface of the
mountain be left in violation of law as the law then
existed and also in violation of the prevailing general
standards then in existence. The Court, however, in
this case does not find that such has been proven,
but does in fact find that the rehabilitation of the
lands in this case was in accordance with the then
prevailing standards of 1975 in the Davis Countv area
and throu~hout the general area of the Wasatch ~ront
and, therefore, also in accordance with the Judgment
of October 23, 1969.
(Emphasis added) (R. 39-40
It is obvious from the Court Findings of Fact that
the Court is heavily relvino upon what the customs and usages
-40-
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are in the industry at the time.

This is not a proper

justification or excuse from a negligence per se finding.

A survey of Court decisions will show that they tend to turn
on whether or not the violation of the statute was something
that was necessary under the circumstances or that the
circumstances were beyond the control of the violator in
order to excuse said violator from the obligations and
duties imposed by the statute or ordinance.
Custom and usage, however, is nowhere accepted as an
excuse from the obligations and duties imposed by a statute
or ordinance.
Effective Custom. Effective violation of a statute
or ordinance as negligent, or negligence per se,
is not changed by the fact that the acts complained
of were done in accordance with the custom or practice
of persons engaged in the same line or work. Evidence
of custom and practice may not be used to contravene
a statutory duty of care.
(65 C.J.S. Negligence,
Sec. 19 (8) p. 641, Hom vs. Clark, 23 Cal. Rptr. 11,
221 C.A. 2d 255, McDonald vs. Foster Memorial Hospital,
170 C.A. 2d 85, 338 P.2d 607 (1959); Sanchez vs. J.
Baron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240 (1967)
POINT VII
THE COURT COMMITTED A PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY ADMITTING IN HEARSAY STATEMENTS
AND STATEMENTS THAT WERE INADMISSABLE
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Court committed prejudicial error in admitting
the testimony of Mr. Clifford Woodland when during the
second day of trial he testified concerning a telephone
conversation with Mr. Sutton, the previous director of
the Davis county Planning Commission as follows:
-41-
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. . . he still insisted that he have a plan of some
sort, so I told him that at that time that I would
submit to him a sketch indicating the general contours
that I felt might be usable, and allowed that to
be submitted to his file."
Q.

What did he say?

A.
In substance, he said, "That ought to do; that's
okay."
(T. 300)
This statement was a preface to the admission of Exhibit
No. 4 by the defendants which was a sketch of contours
submitted apparently pursuant to that conversation.
Thereafter, inaction of Davis County Planning Commission

in failing to require a rehabilitation plan together with
the issuance of an occupation permit on or about December, 1971
became

a prejudicial error in that it was supportive of the

fact that the defendants in fact had submitted an acceptable
rehabilitation plan.

Plaintiff objected to the submission

of this tesimony as hearsay and also inadmissible under
the Statute of Frauds.

(T.

296,

298)

Thereafter a statement by a Mr. Smith pertaining to
an alleged conversation in which Mr. !1/alton, who was purported
to have said that their excavation efforts to rehabilitate
were not to destroy the road into the gravel pit.
of this testimony was to describe that the

The use

Plaintiff-Aooella~

had himself obstructed the rehabilitation effort.

A

caterpillar operator, Mr. Ewing, was purported to have
been approached by Mr. Paul F. Walton and instructed not
to destroy the road.

The statement of Mr. rvalton was

told to Mr. Smith and !"1r. Smith told '1r. ' 1loodland.
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then

In other words, it was a statement purported to have been
made by Mr. T"7al ton to a Mr. Ewing who told
told Mr. Woodland.

~1r.

Smith who

Counsel for the plaintiff objected to

the statement (T. 310) on the grounds that it was hearsay
and further that it was inadmissible under the Statute of
Frauds. (T. 311)

Notwithstanding these objections, Hr.

Woodland testified, "Why didn't you have the road reduced
to 1 1/2:1?"

Answer:

"My superintendant told me that they

were told to leave the road as it was.
access to a spring in the area."

It constituted an

(T. 312)

ON SITE C0NVERSATION THTH PLAINTIFF-APPELLA.."IT
Rule 63 of the Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence of a statement that is made other than by
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay
evidence and inadmissible except'.
Thereafter there are exceptions listed to this rule.

A review of those exceptions reveal that there is in fact
no exceotion to cover this particular situation especially
where it is hearsay on hearsay.

Upon cross examination,

Mr. \<7oodland admitted that the statement originated from
Mr. Ewing who was not in the courtroom and had not been
called as a witness.

Nor did Mr.

the statement made by Mr. Ewing.

~oodland

himself hear

TV[r. Woodland had sat through

the deposition of Mr. Ewing on an earlier date and the
statements of rtr. Ewing were read by Counsel to the plaintiff
to '1r. r,Toodland.

~1r.

Ewing had sa.id:

-43-
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In fact you couldn't identify this man, Mr. \val ton,
(pointing) as being the one who came un?

Q.

A.

No.

The hearsay on hearsay nature is borne out by the followir,testi..rnony:
0. Now, you've got.
.this is supposed to have come
from a statement- from Mr. Ewing from
.the man sitting
on the cat operating at the time?
A.

I got the statement from Mr. Smith.

0. Then Mr. Smith is supposed to have told you.
That is, what one of the cat operators told you,
is that right?
A.

Yes, I believe he did tell me that.

(T. 331)
The transcript continues to refer to the testimony
of Mr. Ewing wherein he describes an individual who approached
him driving a green pickup truck or other vehicle.

(T.

331)

The statement becomes less credible when one analyzes the
fact that Mr. Ewing was not during the deposition able to
recognize Mr. Walton as the individual that came uo to the
site and made the statement to leave the roads as thev
were (T.

332, line 9-18).

This was hearsay on hearsav

in that the statement was sunposed to have been made bv
Mr. Walton to '1r. Ewing who made the statement to lllf.r. Smith
who in turn made it to Mr. Tt./oodland, the one who was testi fyinc
in the trial.

(T. 333, line 13-18)
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It is apparent that the defendants did not call Mr.
Ewing as a witness because he was so confused and
testimony was absolutely worthless.

his

However, they were

able to,,ver the plaintiff's objection, obtain a clear
statement fro!'l Mr. Noodland which was a self-serving statement
and a highly prejudicial statement being made by an individual
who was not the recipient of the conversation.

This is the

rankest kind of hearsay which is not subject to cross examination
or impeachment and therefore was not admissible.
On direct examination of Mr. Woodland, an objection
was also raised by the plaintiff as to the Statute of
Frauds (T. 311) wherein the provisions and terms of the
Statute were enumerated.

The testimony referred to above

of '1r. Woodland would have the effect of vitiating the
claims that the plaintiff has upon the property and the
performance of the defendants pursuant thereto upon the
termination of the lease.

The following provision of the

Statute of Frauds applies:
(U.C.A. 25-5-1)
An Estate or Interest in Real Property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases
for term not exceeding one year, or any trust or
power over or concerninq real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise than
by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
(U.C.A. 25-5-3)
Every contract for the leasing for
a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
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unless the contract, or some note or a memorandum
thereof is in writing subscribed by the party when
a lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.
It is obvious from these provisions that testimony
concerning or relating to the alteration of the obligations
of parties under a lease, the Judgment of October 23, 1969,
and the Stipulation of July 7, 1967 is not properly admissible
unless in writing.

This is because the lease was for a term

exceeding one year, it was concerning real property,

("in

any manner relating thereto") and pertained to the "surrender"
of the said premises.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's decision tends to protect the
defendants herein from any liability due to acts or the
inaction of Davis County Planning Commission in their failure
to enforce the Excavation Ordinance of 1960.

The effect

of that kind of decision is to leave the Plaintiff-Appellant
herein helpless in that he has been stripped of all rights
to which he was entitled under the Judgment of October 23,
1967 and the remedies under the Law of Waste.
Whether or not the Court is willing to admit it,
he has by such a decision established an equitable theorv
of estoppel, stating in essence that since the Davis
County

~lanning

Commission failed to enforce the Ordinance,

they cannot now come forth and enforce it because to do
so would in some wav place the defendants in some disadvantage
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or in some detriment.

Such a

theor~

may be a viable and

acceptable theory when private oarties are involved, but
becomes an invalid theory of law when aoplied against
government agencies.

The law is very clear on the fact

that the governmental agency may not be estopped in enforcing
an ordinance.
Should the Court find that through some notion of
proprietary function, Davis County Planning Commission
does, in fact, have a prooertv interest in the oroperty
in question, herein, and therefore estoppel is effective
as against the Davis County Planning Commission, it is not
available as against this Plaintiff-Aopellant, who was not
a oartv to anv action, conduct, or inaction which went
toward setting up the estoppel.

To hold otherwise would

be to establish a theory which reasonablv ounishes an
individual for something of which he is not responsible.
The Judgment of October 23, 1969 and/or the oral stiuulation
of an open court of July 7, 1967 looked to a time in the
future wherein both parties to the action were given
certain considerations not previously created.

On the one

hand, the defendants herein were able to achieve an extension
of a lease for another ten years, dating from 1965 to 1975.
In consideration for that extension, on the other hand,
the Plaintiff-Appellant and/or his successors in interest
acquired a guarantee or that the property would be returned
to a usable state and that the arbiter would be the Davis
-47-
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County Planning Commission as of the termination date,
May 18, 1975.
The arbitor, Davis County Planning Commission, did,
fol1owing the termination of the lease, attempt to arbitrate
the situation.

Careful studies were made, using exnerts,

mainly the Davis Countv Engineer, Glen Austin, who together
with other individuals made a field study and determined
that the property was left in a condition which would cause
wasting and would cause serious damage.

There were already

signs of serious erosion of the sluffing of the sidehills,
of no vegetation, or anvthinq to stabilize the soils.
That these conditions were extant was verified by the
expert studies made by engineering firm of Byrd Engineering,
using other experts, including Herb Schrieter, the Land
Planner and Designer and Guy Alder, the Vegetation Expert.
All of these individuals, experts in their field, emphatically
described to the Court serious failures on the part of
the defendants to comply with Davis County Planninq Commission
requirements.
~hile

no decision was made regarding the question of

defendant Fife's liability under the lease, nevertheless,
the form o.f the lease and the obligations assumed by Fife
as is apparent in their correspondence with Davis County
Planning Commission, all point to the fact that Fife, rather
than having a sublease under Kenneth F. Walton, in fact
had an assignment of all rights of Kenneth F. r1al ton.
-48-
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It is apparent that they considered the Judgment of October 23,
1969 to be their own obligation, and it is further apparent
that their lease terminated coincident and on the same
date as the lease with Kenneth F. Walton.

Under the law

that constitutes an assignment instead of a sublease and
consequently all rights and claims which the plaintiff
may have against Kenneth F. t·7al ton he now has and would have
against Fife Construction Company.
It is true that the defendants never at any time
filed a rehabilitation olan which is of little probative
value to the central issue of whether they comolied with
Davis County Planning Commission requirements with respect
to terracing and surfacing.

The evidence of their failure

to file such a plan or to comply with the requirements of
Planninq Directors in the oast could only be probative
of the issue of whether or not they intended to do anything
to rehabilitate the oroperty or return it to a usable
state.

One of the rather blatant and apparent deficiencies

in the oleadings on file herein is the defendant's failure
to file any

~otion

to Dismiss the case under the theory

of estoopel nor is said theorv affirmatively pled in the
Answers as is necessary under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Civil nrocedure.

Conse~uently,

the issue of estoppel

is not before the Court and the Court was not at liberty
to issue its decision based upon such a theory.

Notwithstanding

this void in the defendants pleadings and prior pretrial
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litigation, the Court went ahead on its own to estabfr
such a defense for the defendant using as it did the

~

legal theories described herein.
The Court also decided there was no waste per
the Statute or under the Davis Countv Excavation
or under U.C.A. 78-28-2

se~

Ordi~

(1953) because Fife was merelv

following the customs and usage in the trade at the tiff'
of the terMination of the lease and that thev followed
this back through 1969.

~o

where in the law is

there~

provision or any corrunon law orinci!=>le which would estab:
for the defendants a legal "excuse" or "justification'
sufficient to relieve them from liabili tv under waste ,,,
princinles.
In order to establish waste cer se, it must be

1.

That the ordinance or statute was violated.

~if

It is•

that under subsections 1-1-1 •nuroose'' and subsection!·
"Excavation and Backfilling" that the nrdinance was vioi
2.

It must be shown that the de-Fendant co1UJT1itted or

omitted some action wltich would depreciate the value
of the oroperty as it would return to the remainderman.
The evidence is overwhelming as provided in trial thatt
crooertv had been wasted and there is enorT11ous erosion:
wasting of the prooerty.

3.

It must be shown that the'

is no excuse or justification for having violated the o:
rvhile a oerson mav find legal excuse or justification

bf'

of the urgencv of the moment "custom and usage" in thei

-so-
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is explicitlv and expressly excluded from the le~al categories
of excuse or

justi~ication.

It is arrnarent that there was prejudicial error committed
against the Dlaintiff-Aonellant by the Court in admitting
hearsav statements and statements that were inadmissible
under the Statute of Frauds.

Nor were these statements

such as would have been defined as harmless error.

The

statement of the former deceased Davis County Planning
Commission Director, ,'lr. 1:1.odney Sutton, wherein he was
puroorted to have accented defendant Fife's letter of
nctober 7, 1971 and the sketches associated therewith as the
orooer and acceptable rehabilitation plan of said defendant
under the Ordinance was an examnle of prejudicial admission
of a hearsav statement.

This was further a prejudicial

inadmissible statement in that it would in effect alter or
change the obligation due and owing bv the defendants
in reference to real oronerty.
The second error of the Court was admitting the statement
oF

~r.

Clifford Woodland of Fife Construction Comoanv wherein

he is purported heard Mr. Smith, who in turn heard Mr. Ewing,
a caterpillar operator, who is purported to have heard
Plaintiff-Apnellant herein, Mr. Walton, say that the
rehabilitation excavations made hv the defendant was not to,
in any way, affect the road up to the gravel nit.

Based

unon these claims, the defendants were attempting to establish
that the Dlaintiff-Aonellant somehow obstructed their
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rehabilitation efforts and therebv thev are relieved from
a oerformance thereunder.
such a statement is a self-serving statement and is
further subject to the rankest kind of hearsav objections
in that it is a statement made by an individual outside
of Court used to prove the truth of the matter asserted
which was passed from one person to another until it was
finallv

~rovided

in open Court by Mr. Clifford Woodland.

This particular statement is further objectionable
in that it is a violation of the Statute of Frauds in that
it is a statement which would alter the obligations of the
nartv under the original lease and would, in effect, relieve
defendants of their obligations to perform under the Judqment
of 1969.

In those terms and under those circumstances

it was admitted illegally and in violation of the Rules of
Evidence.
the

There is no wav under those circumstances -!'.or

Plaintiff-Ap~ellant

to cross-examine or to impeach

the statement made or otherwise r_:irove that it was not made.
Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel, however, ef-1'.ectively impeached
it by use o-1'. the deposition of

~r.

Ewing, the purported

narty to whom such a statement was given.

From the said

deposition, it is obvious that the said declarant, Mr. Ewing,
could not even recognize Mr. Walton as the individual who
came to talk to him on that day, nor could he remember the
car or the exact statement beinq made.

He does, however,

remember that his foreman had instructed him not to disturb
the roads.
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It is aoparent from what has been described in this
brief that the decision of the Court was not legally sound
and that the decision should be overruled and returned
to the Court for proper disposition in consonance with
the principles herein set forth, and further that the
~laintiff-Appellant

should have a

~udgment

in his favor

against the Defendant-Respondent.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1978.

LYLE J. BARNES
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Village~ Professional Bullding
47 North Main Suite #1
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Telephone:
376-8220
CERTIFICATION 01" MAILING
I certifv two copies of the foregoing Brief of "laintiff
and Appellant, Paul F. Nalton, were mailed this
of

~arch,

day

1978, to Felshaw King, Attorney for Defendant-

Respondant, 251 East 200 South, Clearfield, Utah

84015.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-53-

